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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Utah, Arnold v. 
Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, 180 P.3d 188, filed February 28, 2008, reversing the trial court's 
summary judgment order in favor of David Grigsby, M.D. Therefore, the Utah Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over "a judgment of the Court of Appeals"). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented is whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (recently recodified as 
78B-3-404) is subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (recently recodified as 
78B-2-104).l Although the trial court found "that Plaintiffs discovered the alleged injury no 
later than November 1999, which discovery started the running of the two-year statute of 
limitations, per Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4," and that w*the statute of limitations for this 
action against Dr. Grigsby began running more than two years prior to Plaintiffs filing their 
complaint on December 04, 2001," the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary 
judgment in favor of Dr. Grigsby, holding that wwthe tolling statute, section 78-12-35, applies 
to medical malpractice claims otherwise governed by the Malpractice Act", and "the tolling 
'Defendant/Appellant notes that the legislature has recodified Title 78, a change 
that went into effect on February 7, 2008. Because the renumbering does not change the 
analysis below, and because any substantive changes do not apply to this analysis, 
Defendant/Appellant will cite to the version of Title 78 that was cited by the parties in 
their briefs and in the Court of Appeals' opinion. See Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, n. 2. 
- 1 -
statute suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the time a defendant is 
absent from the state." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 24. 
As both the application of a statute of limitations and the interpretation of statutory 
provisions present questions of law, the standard of review is one of correctness. See 
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ 18, 108 P.3d 741 ("The applicability 
of a statute of limitations . . . [is a] question[] of law, which we review for correctness/") 
(quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^ 32, 44 P.3d 742); Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^ 5, 
162 P.3d 1099 ("This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, a question of law that 
we review for correctness/') On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of 
the Court of Appeals of Utah, not the trial court. John Holmes Constr., Inc. v. R.A. McKell 
Excavating, Inc., 2005 UT 83, f 6, 131 P.3d 199 ("On certiorari, we review the decision of 
the court of appeals, not the trial court/') As the decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah 
rests on questions of statutory interpretation, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the Court of 
Appeals' decision for correctness, affording no deference to the Court of Appeals' legal 
conclusions. Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2006 UT 58, 1^ 8, 147 P.3d 1189 
("As the decision of the court of appeals rests on questions of statutory interpretation, we 
review it for correctness, affording no deference to the court of appeals' legal conclusions.") 
The issues were preserved below in the memoranda filed by the Defendant/Appellant. 
R. 15-30,31-33, 143-151, 154-157, 177-198, 233-260, 335-370, 371-381, and 382-405. 
-? . 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are 
determinative or important to the resolution of this appeal. 
1. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. Power of Congress 
to regulate commerce. 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Effect of absence from state. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out 
of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as 
limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a 
cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of 
the action. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery 
of real property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either 
under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a 
legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose 
of act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims 
for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from 
health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these 
increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of 
-3-
medical malpractice insurance The effect of increased insuiance 
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both 
through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the 
patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine 
because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit 
Furthei, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing 
to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability 
of malpractice insurance 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health 
caie system, it is necessary to piotect the public interest by enacting 
measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to 
continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the 
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of 
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private 
companies 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to piovide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health 
care provideis while limiting that time to a specific penod foi which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and 
accurately calculated, and to provide other pioceduial changes to 
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims 
5 Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 Statute of hmitations-Exceptions-Apphcation 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provide! may be bi ought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff oi patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever fust occuis 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless 
of minority oi other legal disability undei Section 78-12-36 oi any othei 
provision of the law, and shall apply letroactively to all persons, 
partnerships, associations and corpoiations and to all health care 
pioviders and to all malpiactice actions against health caie pio\ ideis 
based upon alleged personal injuries which occuired pnoi to the 
effective date of this act, provided, howevei, that any action w Inch 
under former law could have been commenced after the effectn e date 
of this act may be commenced only withm the unelapsed portion of 
time allowed under formei law, but any action which undei foimei law 
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could have been commenced more than four years after the effective 
date of this act may be commenced only within four years after the 
effective date of this act. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal was brought challenging the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Utah, 
which reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Defendant/Appellant 
David Grigsby, M.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Grigsby"). Dr. Grigsby moved for summary 
judgment against Plaintiffs/Appellees Gina M. Arnold and Charlie S. Arnold (hereinafter 
the "Arnolds") regarding their medical malpractice claim against him because the statute of 
limitations, set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
(the "Act"), had run against Dr. Grigsby. R. 576-84. 
Following briefing by the parties, the trial court on November 21, 2005, and 
December 20, 2005, entered its orders granting Dr. Grigsby" s motion for summary 
judgment. R. 853-60, 871-73. In reaching its decision, the trial court determined that the 
tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, did not apply. R. 853-54, 904-05. Although the 
trial court rejected Defendant/Appellant's argument that the tolling statute did not apply to 
medical malpractice cases, the trial court nevertheless determined that because Dr. Grigsby 
could have been served in accordance with Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-27-24 to -25, the tolling statute did not work to suspend the running of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year limitations period, even though Dr. Grigsby was 
absent from Utah as he had moved to Tennessee to practice medicine in that state. R. 853-
-5-
54, 904-05 In gi anting the motion for summary judgment, the tnal court found "that 
Plaintiffs discovered the alleged injury no later than November 1999, which discoveiy 
started the running of the two-year statute of limitations, per Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4," 
and that "the statute of limitations for this action against Dr Grigsby began lunning moie 
than two years prioi to Plaintiffs filing their complaint on December 04, 2001 " R 853-54, 
904-05 The court also found that "the plaintiffs' claim against Dr Grigsby is time-barred 
on its face " R 859 
The Arnolds appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals of Utah The 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Dr Gugsby, 
holding that "the tolling statute, section 78-12-35, applies to medical malpractice claims 
otherwise governed by the Malpiactice Act the tolling statute suspends the miming of 
the statute of limitations during the time a defendant is absent from the state v Arnold \ 
G//gs6>,208UTApp58 lj 24 
The Utah Supieme Court granted the Defendant/Appellant's Petition foi Writ of 
Certioian to determine whether Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4, the Utah Health Caie 
Malpractice Acf s statute of limitations, is subject to the general tolling statute, Utah Code 
Ann §78-12-35 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The follow ing tacts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review 
1 The Arnolds filed their complaint on December 4, 2001, bringing a medical 
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malpractice action against Dr. Grigsby and others, which action arose from the care 
provided to Mrs. Arnold on July 22, 1999, and alleged, "The procedure and other care 
provided to Gina Arnold by Dr. White and/or Dr. Grigsby were perfomied in a negligent 
manner. As a result, her colon was perforated and she was otherwise injured." R. 3. 
2. The Arnolds further alleged in their complaint, ^Commencing on July 23, 
1999, and continuing thereafter, Gina Arnold was a patient of Dr. White's and/or 
Dr. Grigsby" s at UBMC [Uintah Basin Medical Center] for the purposes of treating the 
symptoms and injuries resulting from the perforation of her bowel and the resulting 
infection. The care provided to her by Dr. White and/or Dr. Grigsby was performed in a 
negligent manner." R. 3. 
3. Mrs. Arnold was initially discharged from Uintah Basin Medical Center on 
July 27, 1999, and the Discharge Summary dated July 27, 1999, identifies Dr. Grigsby by 
name, providing, "Tt was Dr. Grigsby's opinion that the air should have stayed there for 
three or four days before it finally dissipated." R. 793. 
4. Mrs. Arnold was readmitted to Uintah Basin Medical Center and the medical 
record, including the Operative Report dated August 3, 1999, clearly identifies that 
Dr. Grigsby was actively involved in the August 3, 1999, surgery. R.795. 
5. The medical record contains a consultation report concerning Mrs. Arnold 
from Dr. Grigsby dated August 5, 1999. R. 797-98. 
6. Dr. Grigsby perfomied another surgery on Mrs. Arnold on August 11, 1999, as 
indicated in the Operative Report dated August 11, 1999. R. 800. 
-7-
7. The Arnolds both testified in their depositions that they were aware that 
Dr. Grigsby was involved in Mrs. Arnold's treatment while she was still at Uintah Basin 
Medical Center prior to her being transferred to St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City on 
August 16, 1999. R. 804-07, 812-13. 
8. Dr. Grigsby testified that he had a number of conversations with the plaintiffs 
during the time Mrs. Arnold was at Uintah Basin Medical Center. R. 816-20. 
9. Mrs. Arnold testified that in September, 1999, she consulted an attorney 
because she suspected something had gone wrong with her care between July 22, 1999, and 
August 16, 1999, stating, "I just knew something hadn't happened right." R. 808-09. 
10. By September 28, 1999, Mrs. Arnold was represented by counsel, at which 
time she signed before a notary public her Authorization for and Request for Release of 
Medical Information to her attorney, Harold A. Hintze. R. 828. 
11. By letter from her attorney dated November 16, 1999, Mrs. Arnold was aware 
of "complications arising from an initial diagnosis and treatment of her for an intestinal 
condition" and asserted that "complications following the initial treatment of Mrs. Arnold 
rendered her totally incapacitated and prohibited her from maintaining gainful employment." 
By that date, Mrs. Arnold, through her attorney, had begun an investigation into possible 
medical malpractice claims as indicated in her attorney's letter to Uintah Basin Medical 
Center that "this office investigates the possibility of claims that may be filed in relation to 
her initial diagnosis and/or treatment." R. 825-26. 
12. Dr. Grigsby moved from Roosevelt, Utah, in July, 2000, to practice medicine 
-8-
in Oneida, Tennessee R 735, 815, 855 
13 Dr Grigsby was not served with a notice of intent to commence action as 
requned by Utah Code Ann § 78-14-8, and no request for a prehtigation panel review as 
required by Utah Code Ann § 78-14-12 was made until March 18, 2004 R 580 
14 After the Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed naming Dr Grigsby on December 4, 
2001, and following briefing by the parties and oral argument, on November 21, 2005, and 
December 20, 2005, the trial court entered its orders granting Dr Grigsby's motion foi 
summary judgment R 853-60, 871-73 In reaching its decision, the trial court determined 
that the tolling statute, Utah Code Ann § 78-12-35, did not apply R 853-54, 904-05 
Although the trial court rejected Defendant/Appellant's argument that the tolling statute did 
not apply to medical malpiactice cases, the trial court nevertheless determined that because 
Dr Grigsby could have been served in accordance with Utah's long-ami statute, Utah Code 
Ann §§ 78-27-24 to -25, the tolling statute did not work to suspend the mnnmg of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act's two-yeai limitations period, even though Di Grigsby was 
absent from Utah as he had mov ed to Tennessee to piactice medicine in that state R 853-
54, 904-05 In granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court found "that 
Plaintiffs discovered the alleged mjuiy no later than November 1999, which discoveiy 
started the running of the two-yeai statute of limitations, pei Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4," 
and that "the statute of limitations for this action against Dr Grigsby began running more 
than two yeais pnor to Plaintifts filing their complaint on December 04, 2001 " R 853-54, 
904-05 The trial court also found that "the plaintiffs' claim against Di Gngsby is 
-9-
time-barred on its face R 859 
15 The Arnolds filed a Notice of Appeal on May 22, 2006 R 907-909 
16 Following bnefing by the parties and oral argument, the Court of Appeals of 
Utah, on Februaiy 28, 2008, filed its judgment reversing the trial court's summary judgment 
order in favor of David Grigsby, M D Arnold \ Grigsby 2008 UT App 58, f^ 24 The Utah 
Court of Appeals held that the tolling statute, section 78-12-35, applies to medical 
malpractice claims otherwise governed by the Malpiactice Act the tolling statute 
suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the time a defendant is absent fiom 
the state " Id 
17 Dr Gugsby filed a Petition foi Wnt of Certioian with the Utah Supieme 
Court on March 24, 2008 
18 In an Oidei enteied lune 13, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court gianted 
Dr Grigsby's Petition for Writ of Certioran as to the i^sue of [wjhethei Utah Code Ann 
§ 78-14-4 (recently recodified as 78B-3-404) is subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann 
§ 78-12-35 (recently recodified as 78B-2-104) " 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF \RGUMENT 
The Arnolds' medical malpractice action arises out ot the care piovided to 
Mrs Arnold by Di Gugsby and others at the Uintah Basin Medical Centei between July 22 
1999, and August 16, 1999 R 1-4 Because this is a medical malpractice action, it is 
governed by the Utah Health Caie Malpractice Act (the Act ), Utah Code Ann § 78-14-1 
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et seq. The legislature expressly specified that the purpose of the Act is to provide a fixed 
time to bring malpractice claims: wTn enacting this act [Utah Health Care Malpractice Act], 
it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for 
which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. To achieve this purpose, with regard to the 
abbreviated statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, the legislature specified, 
"The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other 
legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4(2). (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the federal district court for Utah, and the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have each interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) to have 
a different meaning in reaching different conclusions, indicating the ambiguity of this 
statute. Given the ambiguity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2), the statute should be 
interpreted as to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and 
purpose expressly stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Given the legislature's expressly 
stated putpose for the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2, the 
statutory language indicating that the fixed statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
claims shall apply to all persons regardless of any other provision of the law clearly 
harmonizes with the legislative intent and purpose of the Act. Therefore, medical 
malpractice actions must be brought within two years regardless of other tolling provisions. 
-11-
By specific legislative mandate, the commencing of a medical action must *wbe 
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 01 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury," and is not 
subject to geneial tolling provisions because "[t]he provisions of this section shall apply to 
all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any 
other pro\ ision of the law " Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 (Emphasis added ) Thus, geneial 
tolling piovisions, including Section 78-12-35, do not apply to the Arnolds' medical 
malpractice claim against Di Grigsby Therefore, the Arnolds' failure to timely commence 
their medical malpractice action against Dr Grigsby within two yeais after they knew oi 
should ha\e known of a possible injury is not cured by the application of any tolling statute 
outside the specific mandates of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
Despite having discovered the alleged injury and suspecting negligence no latei than 
Novembei 1999 (and actually even earlier when they encountered an attorney in Septembei, 
1999), the Arnolds disregaided the requirements of the Act concerning Di Grigsby by filing 
their complaint on December 4, 2001- more than two years after the statute of limitations 
had begun to run R 853-54, 904-05 Based on established principles of statutory 
interpretation, the Arnolds' "claim against Di Grigsby is time-baned on its face " R 859 
-12-
VIL 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DR. GRIGSBYS 
ABSENCE FROM UTAH TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE 
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT'S STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS IS SUBJECT TO TOLLING UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-35. 
The Court of Appeals of Utah held that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's 
two-year statute of limitations, set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, was subject to the 
general statutory tolling provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Arnold v. Grigs by, 
208 UT App 58, 180 P.3d 188. Although the trial court found "that Plaintiffs discovered the 
alleged injury no later than November 1999, which discovery started the running of the 
two-year statute of limitations, per Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4" and that "the statute of 
limitations for this action against Dr. Grigsby began running more than two years prior to 
Plaintiffs filing their complaint on December 04, 2001," the Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court's summary judgment in favor of Dr. Grigsby, holding that "the tolling statute, 
section 78-12-35, applies to medical malpractice claims otherwise governed by the 
Malpractice Act . . . the tolling statute suspends the running of the statute of limitations 
during the time a defendant is absent from the state." Arnold w Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, j^ 
24. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated, "When we interpret statutes, our primary goal 
is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
-13-
achieve " Evans v State, 963 P 2d 177, 185 (Utah 1998) The Evans court went on to point 
out 
We therefoie look first to the statute's plain language We need not look 
beyond its plain language unless we find some ambiguity m it Statutory 
language is ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have moie 
than one meaning 
Id (Citations omitted ) The issue is whethei subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 
overrides the tolling of the statute of limitations found in the general statutory tolling 
provision of Utah Code Ann § 78-12-35 1 The tnal court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the 
federal district court for Utah, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have each interpieted 
the meaning of subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 differently in determining this 
issue See Arnold v Grigsby, 208 UT App 58 180 P 3d 188, Gnffiths-Rast \ Sulzei Spoine 
Tech Inc , 2005 WL 223765 (D Utah) attached as Exhibit A, and Gi ifftths-Rast \ Suiza 
Spoine Tech Inc , 2007 U S App LEXIS 3607 (10th Cir ) attached as Exhibit B Theietoie, 
the statutory language of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4 is cleaily ambiguous as it has been 
undei stood by these four courts to ha\ e more than one meaning 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 Is Clearly Ambiguous \ s the Statute Has Been 
Understood B\ Four Ditfeient Courts To Have More Than One Meaning. 
Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(1) provides that medical malpiactice actions must be 
biought within two years of the discoveiy of the injury 
' Utah Code Ann § 78-12-35 provides Where a cause of action accrues against a 
person when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the teim as 
limited by this chapter after his return to the state If aftei a cause of action accrues he 
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited foi the 
commencement of the action * 
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(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs . . . . 
Subsection (1) is plain and unambiguous. However, the following subsection, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4(2), is not plain but is ambiguous as it "can reasonably be understood to have 
more than one meaning." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). Utah Code Ann. 
§78-14-4(2) provides: 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless 
of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other 
provision of the law . . . . 
A review of the courts' holdings in Arnold v. Grigsby and Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine 
Tech, Inc. demonstrates the ambiguity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2). 
Although both the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court determined that the 
statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2) did not exempt medical malpractice 
actions from tolling statutes, each court did so by interpreting the statutory provision 
differently. The trial court's analysis and the Utah Court of Appeals review of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4(2) reveal that this subsection is susceptible to multiple meanings. The Utah 
Court of Appeals stated: 
In its summary judgment order, the trial court determined that section 
78-14-4(2) did not exempt medical malpractice actions from the reach of 
the tolling statute. It astutely analyzed the issue as follows: 
[I|t is clear to the Court that the language 'or any 
other provision of the law' refers only to other 
provisions of the law which define 'legal disability/ 
This reading is supported by the fact that this language is 
contained within a dependent clause which refers back to, 
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and clarifies the meaning of, the term wall persons ' The 
clause 'regardless of minonty or other legal disability 
undei Section 78-12-36 or any other piovision of [the] 
law' is contained within a single set of commas, indicating 
to this Court that the legislature intended the clause to 
lefer to party status, rathei than to removing this piovision 
from the scope of all other pro\ lsions of law Theiefore, 
the Court rejects Defendant's aigument on this point 
We agree with this structural interpretation of the provision and 
conclude that the phrase 4or any other provision of the law' onl\ 
refers to other provisions of law relating to 'minority or other legal 
disabilities]' that might otherwise affect the limitations period 
Arnold v Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, ^  14, 180 P 3d 188 (Emphasis added ) The 
highlighted sections of the Court of Appeals' conclusion clearly indicates that Utah Code 
Ann § 78-14-4(2) is susceptible to multiple meanings 
Fust, the tnal court determined that "it is cleai to the Court that the language 'oi any 
other provision of the law * refers only to other piovisions of the law which define 'legal 
disability ' Id (Emphasis added ) In other words, according to the trial court, the phiase "oi 
any other pio\ lsion of law" only refers to 'legal disability " 
Howevei, the Court ot Appeals determined that "the phrase woi any othei pio\ ision of 
the law' only refeis to othei piovisions of law relating to 'minority or othei legal 
disabilities] "" Id (Emphasis added ) In othei words, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the phrase "or any other piovision of law" lefers to both "minority oi other legal disability " 
There foie, both the tual court and the Court ot Appeals have undei stood Utah Code Ami 
§ 78-14-4(2) to ha\e moie than one meaning even if then interpretations of this subsection 
led to the same conclusion 
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Similarly, in Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2005 WL 223765 (D. Utah), 
attached as Exhibit A, the federal district court for the district of Utah understood Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4(2) to have a meaning different than either the trial court's or the Utah Court 
of Appeals' interpretation of the statute's meaning, which led the federal district court to a 
different conclusion. In that case, the plaintiff sought to avoid summary judgment on the 
running of the statute of limitations by asserting that Section 78-12-35 had tolled the 
two-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 78-14-4 from the time the defendant 
physician had moved away from the state of Utah. However, the federal district court 
rejected the plaintiffs arguments, finding that "section 78-12-35 is inapplicable to toll the 
statute of limitation." Id. at 4. The federal district court specified: 
The Malpractice Act specifically provides that its two-year 
limitations period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any 
other provision of the law. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2). 
As the Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah 
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically to 
exempt a statute from the tolling statute, it will do so with clear, 
explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v. Labor Comm 'n, 91 P.3d 
849, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because the Malpractice Act 
provides an explicit exception to section 78-12-35 by 
requiring the two-year statute of limitations to apply to "all 
persons," section 78-12-35 does not apply in medical 
malpractice cases. Thus, Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claim against 
Dr. Prasad was not tolled. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) In other words, the federal district court concluded that the Medical 
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations is exempt from the tolling statute because the 
two-year statute of limitations specifically applies to "all persons." 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court's conclusion 
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that Section 78-12-35 does not apply in medical malpractice cases, although with a different 
emphasis on Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2): 
The district court held that medical malpractice actions were 
excepted from the tolling provision of § 78-12-35 because under 
§ 78-14-4(2) the two-year limitation period "shall apply to all 
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under 
Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the lawT (emphasis 
added). The court held that this provision was an "explicit 
exception to section 78-12-35" and that the limitation period was 
not toiled during Dr. Prasad's absences. We agree. 
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607 (10lh Cir.), attached 
as Exhibit B (emphasis in original.) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted that the 
two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions applies to all persons 
regardless of "any other provision of law." 
In summary, these four different courts determined three different formulations of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2): the phrase "or any other provision of the law" can be read to 
(1) modify the term "legal disability"; or (2) modify the phrase "minority or legal disability"; 
or (3) act as a catch-all phrase. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) is clearly 
ambiguous as it can reasonably be understood to have more than one meaning. 
B. Because Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) Is Ambiguous, the Statutory 
Provisions Must Be Harmonized With the Legislative Purpose to Alleviate 
Health Care Costs Via the Establishment of a Fixed Window of Time in 
Which Actions May Be Commenced Against Health Care Providers. 
Four different courts have found four different meanings to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4(2), which have led to two different conclusions as to whether all medical 
malpractice actions are excluded from the general tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-12-35. Once again, the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, "Statutory language is 
ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have more than one meaning." Evans v. 
State, 963 P.2d 177, 185 (Utah 1998). Clearly, the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4(2) is ambiguous. Therefore, an analysis beyond the "plain language" of the statute 
is required. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that when a statute is ambiguous, then an 
analysis of the act in its entirety is required to harmonize its provisions in accordance with 
the legislative intent and purpose. The Evans court indicated: 
However, if we find a provision ambiguous, which causes doubt or 
uncertainty as to its meaning or application, we must analyze the act in 
its entirety and '"harmonize its provisions in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose.'" 
Id. An analysis of the legislative intent and purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act clearly 
indicates that the legislature intended to fix the two-year statute of limitations for all persons* 
medical malpractice actions regardless of any other provision of the law, including the 
general tolling provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. 
Fortunately, Utah's legislature clearly indicated the intent and purpose within the 
Medical Malpractice Act itself. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "we ha[ve] no 
need to speculate as to what purposes the Malpractice Act was intended to serve because the 
purposes were set forth in § 78-14-2." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993). (See 
also Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah 1981) ("The avowed 
legislative purpose for treating the class of health providers differently from other defendants 
is stated in the Act itself") Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 provides: 
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The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for 
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from 
health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these 
increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of 
medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance 
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both 
through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the 
patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine 
because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, 
certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide 
services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of 
malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health 
care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting 
measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to 
continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the 
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of 
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private 
companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health 
care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and 
accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to 
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (emphasis added). The clear intent is to treat medical malpractice 
claims different from other claims. In the medical malpractice context, the abbreviated 
two-year statute of limitations applies regardless of any other provision of the law, including 
general tolling statutes. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision failed to recognize the legislature's clearly 
expressed intent in enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was to limit the time for 
bringing a malpractice action to a specific period of time. However, the Utah Supreme Court 
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has often discussed the legislature's clearly expressed intent to limit the time for bringing a 
malpractice action to a specific period of time as articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. In 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Or., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^  30, 70 P.3d 904, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted: 
According to its own provisions, the purpose of the UHCMA is 
to %*provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time 
to a specific period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated." Id. 
§ 78-14-2. 
In Dowling v. Bullen, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the puipose of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act is to ease health care costs by establishing a specific window of 
time to bring malpractice actions: 
However, the stated puipose of the UHCMA is to alleviate health care 
costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time "in which actions 
may be commenced against health care providers[,] while limiting that 
time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated." 
Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 5 0 4 11, 94 P.3d 915. Given that the stated puipose of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act is "to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for 
which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated," the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) that clearly harmonizes its 
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose is where the two-year 
limitation period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability 
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under Section 78-12-36 01 any other provision of the law" including Utah Code Ann 
§78-12-35 
Instead of attempting to harmonize the piovisions of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) in 
accordance with the legislative intent and puipose as articulated in Utah Code Ann 
§ 78-14-2, the Utah Court of Appeals simply referenced the legislative histoiy of Utah Code 
Ann § 78-14-4(2) The Utah Court of Appeals claimed that "the legislative histoiy supports 
om interpretation ot section 78-14-4(2) " Arnold \ Gngsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 15, 180 
P 3d 188 Howevei, the Utah Supreme Court also analyzed the legislate e histoiy of Utah 
Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) in Blum v Stone, 752 P 2d 898 (Utah 1988) The Blum court 
determined 
In 1979, the legislature responded to Scott and its progeny by amending 
section 78-14-4 See 1979 Utah Laws ch 128, § 1 The amendment 
evinced the legislature's determination to apply the medical malpiactice 
statute of limitations to all plaintiffs' claims, including those of 
minois J Section 78-14-4(2) thereafter stated "The provisions of this 
section shall apply to all persons, legaidless of minonty or other legal 
disability undet $ 78-12-36 oi an\ othei piowsion of law " 
Id at 900 (Emphasis added ) The Utah Supieme Court has clearly indicated that the 
legislative history ''evinced the legislatuie's deteimination to apply the medical malpiactice 
statute of limitations to all plaintiffs' claims Id (Emphasis added ) Theiefoie, the 
legislative histoiy of Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) moie closely paiallels the fedeial district 
'Defendant Appellants are awaie that the Utah Supreme Court determined in Lee 
v Gaufin, 867 P 2d 572 (Utah 1983), that Utah Code Ami *> 78-14-4(2) is 
unconstitutional as applied to minots Howev eu that decision does not apply to the 
present case as it is clear that the Utah Supieme Court confined the unconstitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann § 78-14-4(2) only to those citcumstances when a minor has been injured, 
which circumstances aie not piesent in the pending mattei 
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court's determination in Grifjiths-Rast: 
Because the Malpractice Act provides an explicit exception to section 
78-12-35 by requiring the two-year statute of limitations to apply to 
"all persons/' section 78-12-35 does not apply in medical malpractice 
cases. 
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spoine Tech, Inc., 2005 WL 223765 (D. Utah), attached as 
Exhibit A. 
C. The Court of Appeals' Claim that Its Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4(2) is Not Contrary to the Legislative Purpose of the Act 
Because Dr. Grigsby Could Have Merely Appointed an Agent to Receive 
Service of Process Has Been Rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court as an 
Unreasonable Burden on Interstate Commerce. 
Instead of attempting to harmonize the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) 
in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose as articulated in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-2, the Utah Court of Appeals merely concluded "that our interpretation of section 
78-14-4(2) is not contrary to the purpose of the act." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, 
|^ 19, 180 P.3d 188. Not being contrary is not the same as attempting to harmonize 
provisions with the legislative intent and purpose. 
The Utah Court of Appeals went on to claim its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-4(2) was not contrary to the purpose of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act 
because: 
it still substantially limits the statute of limitations period for 
malpractice actions and still provides the needed predictability for 
insurance companies in the vast majority of cases. . . . As the Arnolds 
argue, and as indicated in section II of this opinion, all medical 
providers need do to make sure the statute of limitations is not 
tolled if they leave Utah is appoint an agent within Utah to receive 
service of process for them. 
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Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, \ 19, 180 P.3d 188. (Emphasis added.) Despite the 
Utah Court of Appeals' claim that its interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) will not affect 
interstate commerce because Dr. Grigsby merely needed to appoint an agent within Utah to 
receive service of process for him to toll the statute of limitations, the United States 
Supreme Court has rejected such claims in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), and its progeny. 
The United States Supreme Court determined that Ohio's tolling statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to out-of-state corporations that did not have an agent 
designated for service of process in Ohio. Id. at 894. The Court pointed out: 
The suggestion that Midwesco had the simple alternatives of 
designating an agent for service of process in its contract with Bendix 
or tendering an agency appointment to the Ohio Secretary of State is 
not persuasive. . . . As we have already concluded, this exaction is an 
unreasonable burden on commerce. 
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894-895 (U.S. 1988). 
Although the facts in Bendix dealt with an out-of-state corporation, courts have extended 
the ruling of Bendix to individuals, such as Dr. Grigsby. 
For example, in the case of Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ohio 1990), the 
court applied Bendix to a statute of limitations tolling claim involving a defendant who had 
moved from Ohio to Pennsylvania to take a new job. The court determined: 
If the events in question here involve an "out-of-state person[] . . . 
engaged in commerce,'' id., then this Court must undertake an analysis 
like the one set forth in Bendix . . . . The threshold question is whether 
Hallas can be deemed, in commerce clause terms, to be or to have 
been "engaged in commerce." Unlike the corporation in Bendix, 
Hallas is not alleged to have been engaged in a business causing him 
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frequently to ship goods or to travel himself interstate Instead, the 
complaint simply states that he lived and worked in Cleveland foi the 
Plain Dealer, and then he moved to Pennsylvania and began a new job 
there The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue two and 
a half score yeais ago, and held that *wthe movement of persons falls 
within the Commerce Clause " Edwards \ California, 314 U S 
160, 172, 86L Ed 119, 62 S Ct 164(1941) Courts since then ha\ e 
follow ed suit, holding that interstate commerce is affected when 
peisons move between states in the course of or in search for 
employment Following Bendix's holding that requiring foieign 
corporations to submit to the geneial jurisdiction of Ohio courts "is an 
unreasonable burden on commerce," it seems plainly "unreasonable" 
foi persons who have committed acts they know might be consideied 
tortious to be held hostage until the applicable limitations penod 
expires Peisons in that position, or businesses desirous of hiring 
them, would be burdened to a gieater degree than Benda's foieign 
corporations, because Ohio has no piocedure that permits a person 
who wishes to move out-of-state to register with the state foi seivice 
purposes 
Tesarv Hallas,738F Supp 240, 241-242 (N D Ohio 1990) Similarly, 
Defendant/Appellant is unaware of a statutory procedure in Utah that permits a person who 
wishes to move out-of-state to register with the state for sei\ice purposes The Tesai couit 
held that the tolling statute did not apply to the defendant since he moved to anothei state 
foi employment Id at 242 Similarly, it is undisputed that Dr Grigsby moved horn Utah 
to Tennessee to practice medicine there, which similarly affects interstate commeice 
D. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) 
Would Negatively Impact Commerce and Is Contrary to the Legislative 
Purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals claims that its mterpietation of section 
78-14-4(2) is not contiaiy to the purpose of the act because "oui mteipietation should not 
cause malpiactice insuiance lates to increase and will not detet healthcare provideis from 
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leaving Utah." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2008 UT App 58, ^ 19, 180 P.3d 188. In other words, 
the Utah Court of Appeals claims that its interpretation of section 78-14-4(2) will not affect 
commerce, including interstate commerce. However, the Utah Court of Appeals does not 
provide anything substantial to back up its claim. Instead, other courts have held that 
similar applications of a tolling statute impact commerce negatively. See Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) and Mcfadden v. Battifora, 2004 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595, 14-15 (Cal. App. 2dDist. 2004) discussed below. 
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that one of the purposes of enacting the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was to control the rising costs of health care: "The Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act was enacted in 1976 to control the rising cost of medical 
malpractice insurance." Plans v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). 
The legislature clearly set forth and codified the intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, which is to address the commercial impact of health care malpractice claims in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Exempting health care malpractice actions from the tolling statute's 
general application is in keeping with the legislative intent of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. However, failing to do so is inconsistent with the legislative intent and by 
extending the two-year statute of limitations logically increases the length of exposure of 
malpractice actions and cannot help but increase insurance rates. 
In addition, applying this interpretation and exempting health care malpractice 
actions from the tolling statute's general application is in keeping with the United States 
Supreme Court's holding on the impact of the Commerce Clause on tolling statutes. Under 
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the Supreme Court's holding in Bendix Auto lite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., and 
its progeny, absences from a jurisdiction for purposes of interstate commerce may not 
constitutionally stop the running of a period of limitations in that jurisdiction. Bendix 
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988). 
In a medical malpractice case involving a tolling statute and a physician who move 
to another state to practice medicine, Mcfadden v. Battifora, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
595, 14-15 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004), the court held that because "Dr. Medeiros, a former 
California resident, moved to Texas to take a new job in 1998, thereby engaging in 
interstate commerce. . . . Under Bendix, section 351 [California's tolling statute] cannot be 
used to toll the otherwise applicable statute of limitations."4 Similarly, Dr. Grigsby moved 
to Tennessee to take a new job in 2000, thereby engaging in interstate commerce and 
affording him the protections of the Commerce Clause. 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix, and its progeny, is consistent 
with the legislative intent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which clearly addresses 
the commercial impact of health care malpractice claims. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated, "we have "a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate 
legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities/" 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). This Court should construe the statutory 
phrase, "or any other provision of law," so as to avoid a conflict with the Commerce Clause 
and to harmonize the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
4A copy of the Mcfadden v. Battifora opinion is attached in the addendum as 
Exhibit C. 
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and to harmonize the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant/Appellant Dr. Grigsby respectfully 
requests that the Utah Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and detennine that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is not subject to tolling under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-35 and uphold the summary judgment of the trial court. 
is RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this£iTaay of July, 2008. 
BURBIDGE & WHITE, LLC 
Larry R/White 
Daniel R. Harper 
Attorneys for David Grigsby, M.D. 
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OPINION BY: DALE A. KIMBALL 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court on Defendants' 
motions for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitation. A hearing on the motions was held on 
September 8, 2005. At the hearing, Plaintiff Valerie Ann 
Griffiths-Rast ("Ms. Griffiths-Rast") was represented by 
D. Bruce Oliver. Defendant Praveen Prasad, M.D. ('Dr. 
Prasad") was represented by Brandon Hobbs, and 
Defendant Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc. ("Sulzer Spine") [*2] 
1
 was represented by Andrea Roberts. Before the hearing, 
the court carefiilly considered the memoranda and other 
materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the 
motions under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the motions. Now 
being fully advised, the court enters the following 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1 Sulzer Spine refers to itself in its memoranda 
as "Zimmer Spine, Inc." However, for purposes 
of this Memorandum Decision and Order, it will 
be referred to as "Sulzer Spine." 
I. BACKGROUND 
The court finds that the following facts are 
undisputed. Ms. Griffiths-Rast sustained a back injury at 
work in February 1997. She was referred to Dr. Prasad 
by her Worker's Compensation carrier. In August 1997, 
after reviewing Ms. Griffiths-Rast's MRI scan, Dr. 
Prasad originally recommended physical therapy; 
however, during a follow-up visit on March 19, 1998, Dr. 
Prasad suggested that she undergo a surgical procedure, 
the BAK Cage implantation, to address her ongoing back 
pain. The BAK Cage is an interbody fusion device 
manufactured by Sulzer Spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated 
that prior to her March 19 visit with Dr. Prasad, she was 
doing better in physical [*3] therapy and able to lift 
seventy pounds, but she still had residual pain after 
physical therapy. She also indicated that Dr. Prasad told 
her with the surgery she had a ninety-five percent chance 
of going back to work after a six month healing process. 
Dr. Prasad performed the surgery on August 3, 1998. 
Prior to surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast signed a consent 
form that authorized Dr. Prasad to perform the surgery, 
and it identified the name of device to be implanted in 
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her spine. Following the surgery, Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
experienced complications and remained in the hospital 
for twelve days. 
During her deposition, Ms. Griffiths-Rast indicated 
that she was aware of a problem with the BAK Cage 
implantation immediately after the surgery during her 
hospital recovery. When asked if she "felt like there was 
a problem with the cage implantation" and "with what 
Dr. Prasad did," she answered affirmatively and further 
testified that "[e]verything went wrong." She also 
indicated that she attributed the pain she experienced 
after surgery "to something Dr. Prasad did or didn't do 
during the procedure" or "to some problem with the . . . 
cage device." Ms. Griffiths-Rast stated that she retained 
counsel [*4] a couple of weeks after her surgery "[w]hen 
[she] wasn't getting any better." 
On November 10, 1998, Ms. Griffiths-Rast received 
an SI injection from a doctor at Parkview Radiology who 
informed her that "there was a healing defect on the left 
side of [the] cage." Ms. Griffiths-Rast admits in her 
response to Dr. Prasad's motion for summary judgment 
that the earliest point where she could reasonably be 
aware of medical malpractice was during this visit to 
Parkview Radiology. 
On November 26, 2001, Dr. Prasad was deposed in a 
case against another patient. During that deposition, Dr. 
Prasad indicated that he had moved out of Utah in 
September 2000. Dr. Prasad also intimated that while he 
was on Sulzer Spine's advisory board from 1998 to 2000, 
he may have periodically been out of the state teaching 
the BAK Cage procedure to his peers around the country. 
Also on November 26, 2001, Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
served Dr. Prasad a Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action ("Notice") as required by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (2002) 
("No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the 
prospective defendant or his [*5] executor or successor, 
at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence 
an action."). Ms. Griffiths-Rast further claims that she 
did not discover the name of the manufacturer of the 
BAK Cage until a meeting with Dr. Prasad on October 4, 
2002. 
On November 26, 2002, a year after serving Dr. 
Prasad Notice, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed a complaint 
against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine alleging 
medical malpractice and products liability respectively. 
On January 30, 2003, Ms. Griffiths-Rast filed an 
amended complaint to include certain factual allegations 
but her claims against both Dr. Prasad and Sulzer Spine 
remained the same. However, she did not serve Sulzer 
Spine with the amended complaint until February 11, 
2004. 
II. DISCUSSION 
1. Standard of Review 
A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate when 
the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. The movant bears an initial burden to 
demonstrate an absence of evidence to support an 
essential element of the non-movant's case. If the movant 
carries [*6] this initial burden, the burden then shifts to 
the non-movant to make a showing sufficient to establish 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
existence of that element. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 US. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 
(1986). 
The non-movant "must do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 
facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 
538 (1986). While the non-movant is entitled to the 
benefit of whatever reasonable inferences there are in its 
favor, the reasonableness of those inferences is 
scrutinized in light of the undisputed facts. Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242, 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute exists only if 
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
248. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the 
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between 
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the 
requirement is that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in 
original). 
2. Dr. Prasad's Motion 
Dr. Prasad argues [*7] that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's 
claims against him are barred by the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act ('"Malpractice Act") which provides that 
"[n]o malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
injury, whichever occurs first." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
4(1) (2002). The discovery of a legal injury occurs "when 
the injured person knew or should have known of an 
injury and that the injury was caused by a negligent act." 
Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1999). Furthermore, '"[discovery of a legal injury, 
therefore, encompasses both awareness of physical injury 
and knowledge that the injury is or may be attributable 
to negligence.'" Id. (quoting Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989)). 
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Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad with 
Notice on November 26, 2001, she must have necessarily 
discovered her legal injury on or after November 26, 
1999 in order to pursue her claim. However, Dr. Prasad 
asserts that at Ms. Griffiths-Rast's deposition she 
admitted to discovering her injury immediately [*8] after 
surgery, which was on August 3, 1998, and thus well 
before November 26, 1999. Dr. Prasad further asserts 
that the latest possible date on which Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
discovered or should have discovered her legal injury 
was November 10, 1998 when a doctor at Parkview 
Radiology informed her of a "healing defect on the left 
side of [the] cage." Accordingly, Dr. Prasad concludes 
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims are barred by the 
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations whether her cause 
of action accrued in August 1998 or in November 1998 
because she served Notice well after the limitations 
period expired for either date. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast concedes that the earliest she 
could have discovered her legal injury was November 10, 
1998. However, she argues that Dr. Prasad's absence 
from Utah in September 2000 and his periodic absences 
between 1998 and 2000 tolled the two-year statute of 
limitations under Utah Code section 78-12-35. This 
statute provides: 
Where a cause of action accrues against 
a person when he is out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the term 
as limited by this chapter after his return 
to the state. If after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, [*9] the 
time of his absence is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
concludes that the time between September 2000, when 
Dr. Prasad left Utah, and November 26, 2001, when he 
was served with Notice, should not be computed against 
her. She also requests further discovery pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) in order to 
establish other periods of time Dr. Prasad was absent 
from Utah during 1998 to 2000. 
However, the court agrees with Dr. Prasad's 
argument that section 78-12-35 is inapplicable to toll the 
statute of limitations. The Malpractice Act specifically 
provides that its two-year limitations period "shall apply 
to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal 
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision 
of the law . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2). As the 
Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he Utah 
Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically 
to exempt a statute from the tolling statute, it will do so 
with clear, explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v. 
Labor Comm'n, 91 P.3d 849, 852, 2004 UT App 137 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). Because the Malpractice Act 
provides an explicit exception [*10] to section 78-12-35 
by requiring the two year statute of limitations to apply 
to "all persons," section 78-12-35 does not apply in 
medical malpractice cases. 2 Thus, Ms. Griffiths-Rast's 
claim against Dr. Prasad was not tolled. Therefore, 
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast discovered or should have 
discovered her legal injury in August 1998 or November 
10, 1998 is immaterial because both dates are well before 
the date she served Dr. Prasad Notice on November 26, 
1999. Accordingly, Dr. Prasad's motion for summary 
judgment is granted. 
2 However, the Utah Supreme Court in Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), held that 
section 78-14-4(2) is unconstitutional as applied 
to minors because they have no standing to 
commence a lawsuit before they reach majority. 
See id. at 579. That reasoning is not applicable in 
the instant case because Ms. Griffiths-Rast was 
not a minor when her cause of action accrued. 
3. Sulzer Spine's Motion 
Sulzer Spine asserts that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claims 
are barred by the Utah Product Liability Act's ("UPLA") 
statute of limitations, which provides that a plaintiff must 
commence a product liability claim within two years of 
the date that plaintiff "discovered, or in the exercise 
[*11] of due diligence should have discovered, both the 
harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3. The 
harm is the physical injury or illness suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct. McKinnon 
v. Tambrands, Inc., 815 F. Supp 415, 418 (D. Utah 
1993). In Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 
250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals 
interpreted the phrase "and its cause" to mean that the 
limitations period did not begin to run "until the plaintiff 
discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, the identity of the manufacturer." Id. at 253. 
The court "reasoned that lacking such information, a 
plaintiff could not know the cause of his or her injury." 
Bank One Utah, N.A. v. West Jordan City, 54 P. 3d 135, 
2002 UT App 271 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (discussing 
Aragon and distinguishing the differences between the 
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and the UPLA's 
statute of limitations). Relying on this language from 
Aragon, Ms. Griffiths-Rast asserts that her products 
liability claim against Sulzer Spine was tolled by her 
inability to discover the identity of the BAK Cage 
manufacturer prior to her meeting with Dr. Prasad on 
October 4,2002. 
"Generally, [*12] the question of when a plaintiff 
knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known, 
of a cause of action is a question of fact for the jury." 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46290, * 
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McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D. 
Utah 1999). However, this determination can be made as 
a matter of law when the evidence is such that no issue of 
material fact exists. Id. "What constitutes due diligence 
'must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It 
is that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the 
end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so.'" 
Aragon, 857 P.2dat253 (citations omitted). 
Ms. GrifTiths-Rast offers no evidence to suggest that 
she made the required due diligence inquiry to determine 
the manufacturer of the BAK Cage prior to meeting with 
Dr. Prasad. She argues that an affidavit of her counsel's 
paralegal, Jason Jensen, indicates that the nurse paralegal 
he contracted with to research the claims against Dr. 
Prasad provided internet literature for the LT-Cage rather 
than the BAK Cage and that, because of this, they were 
led to believe the LT-Cage was the device used. 
However, this does not demonstrate "due diligence." 
While Ms. Griffiths-Rast knew the name of the device 
implanted [*13] in her spine prior to her surgery, and 
she retained counsel to pursue her claim within a couple 
of weeks of the surgery, neither she nor her counsel 
undertook any effort to identify the BAK Cage 
manufacturer prior to meeting with Dr. Prasad. "The 
discovery rule does not allow plaintiffs to delay filing 
suit until they have ascertained every last detail of their 
claims." McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124', see also 
McKinnon, 815 F. Supp. at 421. "All that is required [to 
trigger the statute of limitations] is . . . sufficient 
information to apprise [the plaintiffs of the underlying 
cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make 
further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions" about 
the defendant's actions. McCollin, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 
(quoting United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park 
City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993)). [*14] 
Because Ms. Griffiths-Rast had sufficient information 
immediately after her surgery to put her on notice that 
she may have a cause of action against the manufacturer 
of the BAK Cage, and she did not exercise due diligence 
in discovering the name of the manufacturer, her claim 
against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her failure to 
discover its identity. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast also asserts that her claim against 
Sulzer Spine was tolled by its status as a foreign 
corporation. Specifically, she contends that because 
Sulzer Spine is a foreign corporation and, at the time of 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's surgery, did not have a registered 
agent in Utah pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-21, it 
is not entitled to assert a statute of limitations defense. 
However, the case cited by Ms. Griffiths-Rast to support 
this assertion expressly rejected this argument. See 
Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72 
Utah 137, 269 P. 147 (1928). The plaintiffs in Clawson 
argued that because the defendant failed to comply with 
Utah law authorizing foreign corporations to conduct 
business in Utah, it was not entitled to use a statute of 
limitations defense. Id. at 151. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected this argument [*15] and held that foreign 
corporations may assert a statue of limitations defense 
even if the corporation failed to register an agent or 
otherwise comply with statutes governing foreign 
corporations. Id. at 151-52. The court further stated that 
under the applicable Utah statute, a foreign corporation is 
only barred from "prosecuting or maintaining any action, 
suit, counterclaim, or cross-complaint in any court of the 
state. It does not prohibit such corporation from 
defending an action brought against it." Id. at 152. The 
court concluded that "[t]here is no condition tolling the 
statute [of limitations] as to foreign corporations." Id. 
Therefore, Sulzer Spine's status as a foreign corporation 
did not toll the statute of limitations, and Ms. Griffiths-
Rast's claim is untimely. Accordingly, Sulzer Spine's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment [docket # 54 and docket # 58] are GRANTED. 
Because there are no remaining claims against any 
Defendants, this action is hereby DISMISSED. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Dale A. Kimball 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District [*16] Judge 
Exhibit B 
Page 1 
216 Fed. Appx. 790, *; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607, ** 
1 of 3 DOCUMENTS 
VALERIE ANN GRIFFITHS-RAST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SULZER SPINE TECH, 
a Minnesota corporation also known as Zimmer Spine; PRAVEEN G. PRASAD, an 
individual, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 05-4279 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
216 Fed. Appx. 790; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607 
February 15,2007, Filed 
NOTICE: [**1] PLEASE REFER TO FEDERAL 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 32.1 
GOVERNING THE CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED 
OPINIONS. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion denied by 
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26674 (D. Utah, Mar. 31, 2008) 
PRIOR HISTORY: (D.C. No. 2.02-CV-1267-DAK). 
(D. Utah). 
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46290 (D. Utah, Sept. 14, 2005) 
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED. 
COUNSEL: For VALERIE ANN GRIFFITHS-RAST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant: David B. Oliver, Salt Lake City, UT. 
For SULZER SPINE TECH, a Minnesota corporation 
also known as Zimmer Spine, Defendant-Appellee: Rick 
L. Rose, Brent D. Wride, Kristine Larsen, Ray, Quinney 
& Nebeker, Salt Lake City, UT; Andrea Roberts, Baker 
& Daniels, Indianapolis, IN; Cecilia M. Romero, Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, UT. 
For PRAVEEN G. PRASAD, an individual, Defendant-
Appellee: Christian W. Nelson, Holly Bierkan Platter, 
Brandon B. Hobbs, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, 
Salt Lake City, UT. 
JUDGES: Before HARTZ, HOLLOWAY, and 
BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 
OPINION BY: Bobby R. Baldock 
OPINION 
[*791] 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
* After examining the briefs and appellate 
record, this panel has determined unanimously 
that oral argument would not materially assist the 
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is 
therefore ordered submitted without oral 
argument. This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of 
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. 
R.32.L 
[**2] Plaintiff-appellant Valerie Ann Griffiths-Rast 
appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
defendants-appellees Sulzer Spine Tech (Sulzer) and 
Praveen G. Prasad, M.D. Ms. Griffiths-Rast underwent a 
back surgery on August 3, 1998, during which Dr. Prasad 
implanted a "BAK Cage" manufactured by Sulzer into 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast's spine. Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
subsequently served Dr, Prasad with a notice of intent to 
commence action on November 26, 2001, and filed her 
complaint on November 26, 2002, alleging a violation by 
Dr. Prasad, of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 through 78-14-16 (1998), 
and a violation by Sulzer of the Utah Product Liability 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 through 78-15-6 (1998). 
The district court granted summary judgment to Dr. 
Prasad on the ground [*792] that the claim against him 
was barred by the two-year statute of limitation found in 
§ 78-14-4(1) and that the limitation period in that statute 
was not tolled by application of 78-12-35. The district 
court granted summary judgment to Sulzer on the ground 
that the claim against it was barred by the two-year 
statute of limitation [**3] found in § 78-15-3. Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast appealed, and we exercise our jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C § 1291 and affirm. 
A. Standard of Review 
"We review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used 
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by the district court." Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of 
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 
1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is 
appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). A statute of limitation defense is an affirmative 
defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Where a defendant 
seeks summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative 
defense, 
[t]he defendant . . . must demonstrate 
that no disputed material fact exists 
regarding the affirmative defense asserted. 
If the defendant meets this initial burden, 
the plaintiff must then demonstrate [**4] 
with specificity the existence of a disputed 
material fact. If the plaintiff fails to make 
such a showing, the affirmative defense 
bars his claim, and the defendant is then 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
B. Claim Against Dr. Prasad 
Under §78-14-8: 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be initiated unless and 
until the plaintiff gives the prospective 
defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast served Dr. Prasad a notice of intent to 
commence action on November 26, 2001. The district 
court granted Dr. Prasad summary judgment on the 
ground that the two-year malpractice statute of limitation 
barred Ms. Griffiths-Rast's claim because she should 
have discovered her legal injury prior to November 26, 
1999. It further held that the limitation period was not 
tolled by any periods of time during which Dr. Prasad 
was absent from the state of Utah. Ms. Griffiths-Rast 
argues that the grant of summary judgment was improper 
because a reasonable jury could [**5] have found (1) 
that the two-year statute of limitation should not have 
begun to run until July 2, 2001, the date she claims she 
discovered her legal injury, and (2) that the limitation 
period was tolled by § 78-12-35. 
1. Discovery of Legal Injury 
Under §78-14-4(1): 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury, whichever 
first occurs, but not to exceed four years 
after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence. 
The two-year statute of limitation in this section begins 
to run when "the injured person knew or should have 
known that [she] had sustained an injury and that the 
injury was caused by negligent action." Foil v. Ballinger, 
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). "[Discovery of legal 
injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness of 
physical injury and knowledge that the injury is or may 
be attributable to negligence." Collins v. Wilson, 1999 
UT 56, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1999) (quotation 
omitted). "[A]ll that is [*793] required [**6] to trigger 
the statute of limitations is sufficient information to put 
plaintiff[] on notice to make further inquiry if [she] 
harbors doubts or questions." Macris v. Sculptured 
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, 24 P.3d 984, 990 (Utah 
2001). 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast testified in her deposition that 
"immediately after the [August 3, 1998, surgical] 
procedure," while she was still in the hospital recovering, 
she felt that there was a problem with the cage 
implantation, and there was a problem with what Dr. 
Prasad did, and that "[everything went wrong." Aplt. 
App., Vol. 1 at 77-78, 80. Ms. Griffiths-Rast also 
testified that she contacted a lawyer about the problems 
with her back surgery "a couple of weeks after [her] 
surgery" when she "wasn't getting any better," and that 
she signed an agreement retaining the attorney's services 
at that time. Id. at 104. Further, on November 10, 1998, 
another doctor informed Ms. Griffiths-Rast that there 
was a defect with the cage implantation. Id., Vol. 2 at 
204-05, 210. Ms. Griffiths-Rast produced no evidence in 
response to Dr. Prasad's summary judgment motion to 
refute these facts, admitting that she had discovered 
[**7] the malpractice in November 1998. See Aplt. 
App., Vol. 2 at 210.l 
1 The argument presented in her response was 
that she discovered the malpractice in November 
1998. &?e Aplt. App. at 210. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that she did 
not discover her legal injury until July 2, 2001, when she 
received a report from a Dr. Stephen Wood stating that 
he had been told by the Utah Malpractice Insurance 
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association that "there have been numerous malpractice 
suits filed due to complications resulting from 'The Cage1 
. . . [and that he] ha[d] been told that the procedure is no 
longer recommended." Aplt. App. at 200. Ms. Griffiths-
Rast argues that the determination of when she 
discovered her legal injury is a factual question not 
suitable for summary judgment. 
Ms. Griffiths- Rast misinterprets the summary 
judgment standard. The question is whether there is a 
"genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed R. Civ. P. 
56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of [**8] material 
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such 
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
nonmovant," Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 
935, 150 Fed. Appx. 819 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, no 
reasonable jury could find that Ms. Griffiths-Rast did not 
have sufficient information to put her on notice to 
conduct a further inquiry into whether there was 
malpractice until after November 26, 1999. In fact, she 
admitted that she believed that there was something 
wrong with Dr. Smith's performance immediately after 
the August 1998 surgery and that she hired an attorney a 
couple of weeks later to conduct an inquiry into possible 
malpractice. 
2. Tolling of Statute of Limitation 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues in the alternative that even 
if she was aware of her legal injury prior to November 
26, 1999, the limitation period should have been tolled 
for some of that time because (1) Dr. Prasad conducted 
business outside of Utah for periods of time between her 
surgery and September 2000, and (2) Dr. Prasad moved 
from Utah to California in September 2000. Under § 78-
12-35: 
Where a cause of action accrues against 
a person when he is out of the state, the 
action may [**9] be commenced within 
the term as limited by this chapter after 
his return to the state. If after a cause of 
action accrues he departs from the state, 
[*794] the time of his absence is not part 
of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues that it is a disputed genuine 
issue of fact whether Dr. Prasad was absent for enough 
time so that tolling the statute of limitation for that period 
of time would result in the statue not being violated. She 
argues that the district court should have conducted a 
separate trial to decide this issue. 
The district court held that medical malpractice 
actions were excepted from the tolling provision of § 78-
12-35 because under § 78-14-4(2) the two-year limitation 
period "shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority 
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any 
other provision of the law" (emphasis added). The court 
held that this provision was an "explicit exception to 
section 78-12-35" and that the limitation period was not 
tolled during Dr. Prasad's absences. We agree. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues on appeal that the tolling 
provision in § 78-12-35 is applicable despite the 
language in § 78-14-4(2). [**10] She first directs us to 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 n.3 (Utah 
1997). In that footnote, the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that the family of a woman who allegedly died of 
malpractice argued that they should be able to file her 
suit outside the two-year statute of limitation because 
under §78-12-37: 
[I]f a person entitled to bring an action 
dies before the expiration of the time 
limited for the commencement thereof, 
and the cause of action survives, an action 
may be commenced by [her] 
representatives after the expiration of that 
time and within one year from [her] death. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled against the family on the 
ground that the statute of limitation had run prior to the 
woman's death. Jensen therefore does not support Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast's argument. A ruling that § 78-12-37 did 
not apply because the limitation period expired prior to 
the decedent's death, is not the same as ruling that § 78-
12-37 would have applied if the limitation period had not 
expired. There is no indication that the court even 
considered the effect of § 78-14-4(2) on § 78-12-37. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast also argues that the Utah Supreme 
[**11] Court found that § 78-14-4(2) was 
unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Lee v. Gaufin, 
867 P.2d 572, 580-81 (Utah 1993), the court found that § 
78-14-4(2) created an exception to § 78-12-36, which 
generally tolls limitation periods as to claims of minors 
until the minor reaches the age of majority. Since Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast's brief does no more than note that Lee 
found § 78-14-4(2) unconstitutional in that it nullified § 
78-12-36, we can only assume that she is asserting, 
without argument, that it is also unconstitutional when 
applied to nullify to § 78-12-35. We disagree. 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lee was 
premised on the fact that, since minors had no legal 
capacity to sue in Utah, application of § 78-14-4(2) in 
some cases would result in the statute of limitation 
running prior to the minor coming of age and being 
legally able to bring his or her action. Lee, 867 P.2d at 
580. Consequently, application of § 78-14-4(2) would 
deprive some minors of access to the court system. Id. 
Here, there is no such problem. Considering the 
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), Utah R. Civ. P. 4 
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[**12] , and Utah's long-arm statute, § 78-27-24, 2 it is 
clear [*795] that a potential defendant's flight to another 
state will not immunize him from suit. Dr. Prasad was 
jiimself served with process after he moved to California. 
2 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e): 
Unless otherwise provided by 
federal law, service upon an 
individual from whom a waiver 
has not been obtained and filed . . . 
may be effected in any judicial 
district of the United States: 
(1) pursuant to the law of the 
state in which the district court is 
located, or in which service is 
effected, for the service of a 
summons upon the defendant in an 
action brought in the courts of 
general jurisdiction of the State; or 
(2) by delivering a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to 
the individual personally or by 
leaving copies thereof at the 
individual's dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and 
discretion then residing therein or 
by delivering a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to 
an agent au thor ized by 
appointment or by law to receive 
service of process. 
Under the pertinent parts of Utah R. Civ. P. 
4(d)(1): 
(d)(1) Personal service. The 
summons and complaint may be 
served in any state or judicial 
district of the United States . . . . If 
the person to be served refuses to 
accept a copy of the process, 
service shall be sufficient if the 
person serving the same shall state 
the name of the process and offer 
to deliver a copy thereof. Personal 
service shall be made as follows: 
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual 
. . . by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the 
individual personally, or by 
leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion there 
residing, or by delivering a copy 
of the summons and the complaint 
to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive 
service of process[.] 
Under the pertinent parts of § 78-27-24: 
Any person . . . whether or not a 
citizen or resident of [Utah], who 
in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself, and if an 
individual , his pe r sona l 
representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of [Utah] as to any 
claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any 
business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply 
services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury 
within this state whether tortious 
or by breach of warranty; 
[**13] 
3 Ms. Griffiths-Rast also raises a brief argument 
that under § 78-14-8 she was entitled to a 120-day 
enlargement of the four-year limitation period 
imposed by the statute of repose found in § 78-
14-4(1). This argument is meritless. First, the 
district court held that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's action 
was barred under the malpractice act's two-year 
statute of limitation, not the four-year statute of 
repose. Second, under § 78-14-8, a malpractice 
action may not be commenced unless the 
prospective defendant is given notice of the 
plaintiffs intent to commence an action at least 
ninety days prior to the filing of the suit. If the 
notice is served "less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the applicable time period, the time 
for commencing the malpractice action against 
the health care provider shall be extended to 120 
days from the date of service of the notice." Id. 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast served her notice of intent in 
November of 2001. Ms. Griffiths-Rast admitted 
that she discovered her legal injury in November 
of 1998. Therefore, even if the date that she 
admitted discovery is used, the two-year statute 
of limitation period ran in November 2000, a year 
prior to the filing of her notice. 
[** 14] C. Claim Against Sulzer 
Page 5 
216 Fed. Appx. 790, *; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3607, ** 
Under § 78-15-3, a legal action under the Utah 
Product Liability Act: "shall be brought within two years 
from the time the individual who would be the claimant 
in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due 
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its 
cause." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that because 
the statute of limitation in § 78-15-3 runs from the time 
the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered both 
the harm and its "cause," the reference to "cause" in that 
section "tolls the running of the statute of limitation until 
the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence 
should have discovered, the identity of the 
manufacturer." Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Because Ms. 
GrifTiths-Rast did not file her complaint until November 
26, 2002, [*796] her claim is barred unless she did not 
discover, or in the exercise of due diligence should not 
have discovered, that the BAK Cage had injured her and 
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after 
November 26, 2000. 
Ms. GrifTiths-Rast testified that she felt as if there 
was a problem with the cage implantation while [**15] 
she was in the hospital immediately after her surgery on 
August 3, 1998; that the BAK Cage hurt and "felt" like it 
was "defective"; and that she had been able to feel that 
the BAK Cage was defective since its implantation. Aplt. 
App., Vol. 1 at 80-81, 101-02. Because all that is 
required to start the running of the limitation period is 
information sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice to 
make further inquiry," Macris, 24 P.3d at 990, we don't 
believe a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Griffiths-
Rast should not have discovered with the exercise of due 
diligence that the BAK Cage had injured her until after 
November 26, 2000. 
The more difficult question is whether, as a matter of 
law, through the exercise of due diligence, she should 
have discovered that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the 
BAK Cage prior to November 26, 2000. The district 
court correctly noted in another case that "[generally, the 
question of when a plaintiff knew, or with reasonable 
diligence should have known, of a cause of action is a 
question of fact for the jury." McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 
50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1123 (D. Utah 1999). As noted 
above, however, the relevant [**16] question is whether 
there is a "genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added), and "an issue of material 
fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such 
that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
nonmovant," Garrison, 428 F.3d at 935. The district 
court held that no reasonable jury could find that Ms. 
Griffiths-Rast had exercised due diligence in discovering 
that Sulzer was the manufacturer of the BAK Cage, and 
that "her claim against Sulzer-Spine was not tolled by her 
failure to discover its identity." Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 361. 
On appeal, Ms. Griffiths-Rast argues again that she 
did not discover that she had a legal injury until July 2, 
2001, when Dr. Wood's letter told her about other 
malpractice claims that had been raised. Once she 
discovered that she had a legal injury, she "first 
commenced the medical malpractice portion of her suit 
before proceeding with the products liability aspect" of 
her suit. Br. of Aplt. at 35. She alleges that she did not 
begin her product liability case at the same time as her 
medical malpractice case because "she needed 
confirmation from [**17] Dr. Prasad [regarding] who 
the manufacturer was." Id. She argues that given the 
"fact" that she did not discover her legal injury until July 
2, 2001, and that she did not discover that Sulzer 
manufactured the BAK Cage until October 4, 2002, "[a] 
reasonable jury [could] find . . . that she did not 
reasonably discovery [sic] the name of the manufacturer 
of the BAKTM Cage until October 2002." Br. of Aplt. at 
39-40. 
We disagree. As properly noted by the district court, 
"[w]hat constitutes due diligence must be tailored to fit 
the circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which 
is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is 
reasonably calculated to do so." Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253 
(quotation omitted). It seems clear that in a normal case a 
reasonable jury could not find that it would take over two 
years to determine the manufacturer of a trademarked 
medical device when the party knows the correct name of 
that device. 4 [*797] The question then becomes 
whether Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented evidence that 
would allow a reasonable jury to find that even if she had 
used "diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the 
end sought and which is reasonably [**18] calculated to 
do so," Aragon, 857 P.2d at 253, she should not have 
ascertained the identity of the manufacturer prior to 
November 26, 2000. She presented no such evidence. 
4 Sulzer presented the consent form signed by 
Mr. Griffiths-Rast showing that she was going to 
have spinal fusion surgery with "BAK cages." 
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 332, 341. In Ms. Griffiths-
Rast's appellate brief, she notes that one of the 
"assumptions" that she had made, that Dr. Prasad 
eventually corrected, was that the "BAK" in BAK 
Cage was a typographical error for the word 
"back." Br. of Aplt. at 35. 
In fact, Ms. Griffiths-Rast presented the district 
court with the affidavit of a paralegal that worked for her 
attorney to help explain why it had taken four years to 
determine the manufacturer of the BAK Cage. The 
paralegal averred that the firm had contracted with an 
outside "nurse paralegal" who "was employed to research 
the claims against the doctor." Aplt. App. at 316. 
According to the affiant, the nurse paralegal "provided 
[**19] some internet literature" for a "LT-Cage," and 
that Ms. Griffiths-Rast's attorney was "led to believe that 
the LT-Cage was a recently approved Cage from the 
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same manufacturer of the BAK Cage." Id. According to 
Ms. Griffiths-Rast, she and her attorney went to the 
October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad, "with literature 
concerning a the [sic] LT-Cage product manufactured by 
different [sic] company believing that was the product 
implanted into her," and Dr. Prasad informed them that 
they had the wrong device. 
Consequently, the evidence presented to the district 
court did not show that because of the circumstances of 
the case a reasonable jury could have found that with the 
exercise of due diligence she should not have discovered 
that Sulzer manufactured the BAK Cage until after 
November 26, 2000. It showed instead that because the 
outside nurse paralegal led her attorney to the 
misunderstanding that the "LT-Cage" and the BAK Cage 
were made by the same company, she misidentified the 
manufacturer and proceeded under that misidentification 
until the October 2002 meeting with Dr. Prasad. 
court that Sulzer had gone through a [**20] number of 
company name changes and was a foreign corporation 
without a registered agent in Utah. She made no 
argument, however, that these facts impeded her ability 
to identify Sulzer as the manufacturer of the BAK Cage. 
Consequently, we see no error in the district court's grant 
of summary judgment on this issue. 
D. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to Dr. Prasad and Sulzer is 
AFFIRMED. 
Entered for the Court 
Bobby R. Baldock 
Circuit Judge 
It is true that Ms. Griffiths-Rast noted in the district 
Exhibit C 
Page 1 
2004 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 595, * 
1 of 1 DOCUMENT 
LORNA McFADDEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HECTOR A. BATTIFORA et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
B160895 
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, 
DIVISION FOUR 
2004 Cal App. Unpub. LEXIS 595 
January 23,2004, Filed NOTICE: [*1] NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN 
OFFICIAL REPORTS CALIFORNIA RULES OF 
COURT, RULE 977(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND 
PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON 
OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR 
ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY 
RULE 977(B) THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED 
PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 977 
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from a judgment of the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jan A Pimm, 
Judge Los Angeles County Super Ct No BC242047 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed 
COUNSEL: Law Offices of Michels & Watkins and 
Steven B Stevens for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Fonda & Fraser and Peter M Fonda for Defendants and 
Respondents 
JUDGES: CURRY, J We concur EPSTEIN, J, Acting 
P J , HASTINGS, J 
OPINION BY: CURRY 
OPINION 
Appellant Lorna McFadden appeals from a judgment 
entered after a jury found that the statute of limitations 
barred appellant's medical malpractice action against 
respondents Hector Battifora, M D , and Jeffrey 
Medeiros, M D We affirm 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Certain facts are not in dispute In May 1997, 
appellant Lorna McFadden went to see her doctor, Tadao 
Fujiwara, M D, to investigate a lump in her left breast 
Dr Fujiwara ordered a mammogram and [*2] biopsy 
After the biopsy, a nurse from Dr Fujrwara's office 
called appellant and told her that she was to come in for a 
mastectomy Later that same day, however, Dr Fujiwara 
telephoned appellant to tell her she did not have cancer 
and repeated his assurances in person the next day 
In June 1999, appellant, having moved to Las Vegas, 
went to have her breast examined at a new clinic in 
connection with a lump she felt at that time ' She 
underwent a mammogram and biopsy in August of that 
year This time the diagnosis was cancer, and in 
September 1999, appellant underwent a mastectomy, 
including removal of several lymph nodes In addition, 
she underwent chemotherapy from November 1999 to 
February 2000 
1 There was a dispute of fact concerning the 
location of the lump felt in 1999, and whether it 
was in the same location as the lump felt in 1997 
In February 2000, appellant contacted a lawyer The 
complaint for medical malpractice was filed on 
December 19, 2000, naming respondents, among others 2 
It was proceeded [*3] by the '"Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action" required by statute whenever suit is 
brought against a health care provider (See Code Civ 
Proc, § 364 subd (a)) The notice was served October 
13,2000 
2 Due to the truncated nature of the proceedings, 
there is no evidence in the record explaining how 
respondents were involved in appellant's medical 
care Dr Medeiros is described in the briefs as a 
former pathologist for the City of Hope who 
diagnosed the tissue sample from the 1997 biopsy 
as non-cancerous 
Several defendants, including respondents herein, 
sought a bifurcated trial on the statute of limitations as 
permitted by Code of Civd Procedure section 597 5 ' 
Trial commenced on the statute of limitations defense 
The only witness called was appellant herself After 
hearing her testimony and reviewing certain medical 
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records introduced as exhibits, the jury answered the 
following questions in the affirmative: "Did [appellant] 
suspect, prior [*4] to October 13, 1999, that the alleged 
misdiagnosis was caused by someone's wrongdoing?" 
and "Would a reasonable person have suspected, prior to 
October 13, 1999, that the alleged misdiagnosis was 
caused by someone's wrongdoing?" 
3 Section 597.5 provides that "in an action 
against a physician" and other types of 
professional health care providers "based upon 
the person's alleged professional negligence" if a 
statute of limitations defense is raised and either 
party so moves, "the issues raised thereby must 
be tried separately and before any other issues in 
the case are tried." 
Following the verdict, the parties briefed the issue of 
whether the limitations statute should have been tolled 
with respect to Dr. Medeiros due to his absence from the 
state since May 1998, when he moved to Texas to take a 
new job. The court ruled that there was no basis for 
tolling, and judgment was entered in favor of respondents 
on July 8,2002. This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
I 
The parties agree that the governing [*5] statute of 
limitations is found in Code of Civil Procedure section 
340.5, which provides in relevant part: "In an action for 
injury or death against a health care provider based upon 
such person's alleged professional negligence, the time 
for the commencement of action shall be three years after 
the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first." As 
explained in Kitzig v. Nordquist (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 
1384, 1391, this statute "sets forth two alternate tests for 
triggering the limitations period: (1) a subjective test 
requiring actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury 
was caused by wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test 
requiring a showing that a reasonable person would have 
suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing. 
[Citation.] The first to occur under these two tests begins 
the limitations period." 
Appellant contends that the essence of the 
underlying statute of limitations defense was that 
appellant "should have known, sometime between 
August 10 and October 13, 1999, that she was 
misdiagnosed in 1997, because [*6] Dr. Fujiwara's nurse 
told her in that year that she had cancer" and that 
respondents' position "rests solely on the belief that the 
nurse's comment ~ corrected by her physician hours later 
— should have triggered a suspicion of wrongdoing two 
years later." Selectively quoting from closing argument, 
appellant implies that this fact was "the linchpin of 
[respondents'] affirmative [statute of limitations] 
defense." 
Appellant misperceives the evidence that supported 
the jury's findings. The evidence demonstrated that 
appellant went to see Dr. Fujiwara about a lump in her 
left breast in May 1997. He ordered a mammogram and 
biopsy and, having received the results and consulted 
with other physicians, told her she did not have cancer. 
Two years later, in the summer of 1999, a new doctor 
diagnosed cancer in the same breast. Appellant 
underwent a mastectomy in September 1999. That is the 
point at which a reasonable person should have been 
suspicious of the original diagnosis of no cancer. Yet 
appellant did not submit the required statutory notice to 
her health care providers until October 2000, more than a 
year later.4 
4 If the statutory notice is submitted within the 
last 90 days of the limitations period, it extends or 
tolls the statute for up to 90 days depending on 
the precise day it was served within the 
limitations period. (Code Civ. Proc, § 364, subd. 
(d); Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380, 
385.) 
[*7] The significance of the call from Dr. 
Fujiwara's nurse was not that it should have made 
appellant immediately suspicious of her doctor's 1997 
diagnosis. A patient is entitled to believe reassuring news 
from her doctor or another physician. In Kitzig v. 
Nordquist, supra, for example, the patient sought a 
second medical opinion and was assured in 1994 that she 
was being treated appropriately. She brought suit in 
1996, within a year of being told by other physicians that 
something was going wrong. The court held that she was 
not obligated to bring suit within one year of her initial 
suspicion since a patient should not be "placed in the 
position of conducting a full investigation" to determine 
whether litigation is appropriate after "the second doctor 
confirms that the first doctor is doing everything right." 
(81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1393.) 
To a similar effect is the decision in Artai v. Allen 
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, discussed in appellant's 
reply brief. There, appeal was taken from a judgment in 
favor of defendant based on a statute of limitations 
defense after the initial phase of a bifurcated nonjury 
trial. The facts indicated that [*8] plaintiff awoke after 
pelvic surgery in May 1998 with severe and persistent 
throat pain. Plaintiff saw at least 20 specialists in the next 
18 months and was given numerous conflicting 
diagnoses. In May 1999, she stated on a medical form 
that she believed her continuing pain was due to "some 
sort of trauma [that was] caused during intubation [for 
anesthesia during the surgery]." (Id. at p. 276, italics 
omitted.) In November 1999, plaintiff underwent 
exploratory surgery and was told that there was a fracture 
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in her thyroid cartilage, but not that it was or may have 
been caused by the intubation during the 1998 surgery. 
Nevertheless, the diagnosis caused plaintiff to attribute 
the fracture to the intubation. She filed her complaint 
against the anesthesiologist on October 27, 2000. The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence did not 
support the finding that plaintiff knew, or by reasonable 
diligence should have known, that her throat pain was 
caused by professional negligence until the 1999 
exploratory surgery. The court noted that "[plaintiff] was 
a model of diligence" in that "she consulted at least 20 
specialists in the 18 months following the May 8, 1998, 
surgery" [*9] and "was given some two dozen possible 
diagnoses, including tonsil infection, cancer, lupus, 
emotional and/or mental problems and asthma." (Id. at p. 
281.) Because "the necessary facts could not be 
ascertained without exploratory surgery" and diligence 
did not require plaintiff to immediately resort to surgery, 
the court could not agree that plaintiffs claim was 
untimely. (Ibid.) 
Appellant here admits that her suspicions of 
negligence were aroused after the 1999 diagnosis of 
cancer as soon as Dr. Fujiwara's diagnosis of no cancer 
in the same breast crossed her mind. To support her 
position that she did not have any misgivings prior to 
February 2000, she testified that the earlier diagnosis was 
driven from her head by the 1999 cancer diagnosis, 
surgery, and followup chemotherapy treatments, and that 
she "never thought about" the 1997 diagnosis until 
February 2000 when she was "reminded" of it by a 
friend. The nurse's call was significant because it cast 
doubt on appellant's testimony that she did not think 
about the 1997 diagnosis until February 2000. In 
response to appellant's theory, counsel for respondents 
argued in closing: "There are certain things in your [*10] 
life that you never forget. Being told you have cancer, 
thinking your are going to die, having the dark cloud 
surround you as [appellant] talked about, having the light 
shine back upon you, you never forget." Counsel further 
pointed out that appellant had been able to provide the 
doctors in Las Vegas with the names of her prior 
physicians and releases so that they could obtain her 
medical records, and told them about the prior biopsy. 
On those facts, the jury was entitled to believe that 
appellant was being untruthful when she claimed to have 
forgotten the traumatic occasion on which she was 
initially told she had breast cancer and then, a few hours 
later, told she did not. Accordingly, the jury had ample 
ground to believe that appellant's suspicion of 
wrongdoing was or should have been aroused in the 
summer of 1999, when she was diagnosed with cancer by 
the Las Vegas doctors and suffered the removal of her 
left breast. 
II 
The remaining issue has to do with tolling under 
section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure (section 351) 
which provides in relevant part: "If, when the cause of 
action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the 
action [*11] may be commenced within the term herein 
limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause 
of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of 
his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action." 5 Because Dr. Medeiros 
moved to Texas in May 1998, prior to the accrual of the 
one-year statute of limitations, appellant maintains that 
the statute has not run as to him.6 
5 Despite its language, courts have held that a 
defendant "need not 'enter' or 'return' to the state 
in order for the plaintiff to commence an action 
which takes advantage of the tolling provisions of 
section 55/." (Green v. Zissis (1992) 5 
Cal.App.4th 1219, 1223.) In 1979, the California 
Supreme Court held that the modern availability 
of alternate methods of service in place of 
personal delivery of a summons and complaint, 
such as substituted service and service by 
publication, had no impact on section 35Ts 
continued viability. (Dew v. Appleberry (1979) 23 
Cal.3d630, 634-636, 153 Cal. Rptr. 219.) 
6 Appellant devotes a considerable portion of 
her brief to the issue of whether section 351 can 
ever be applied to toll the one-year medical 
malpractice limitations period due to a restriction 
on tolling found in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 340.5. Respondents concede that it can. 
[*12] In Bendix Auto lite Corp. v. Midwesco 
Enterprises (1988) 486 U.S. 888, 100 L. Ed. 2d 896, the 
United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio tolling 
statute similar to section 351 unnecessarily burdened 
interstate commerce because it barred foreign 
corporations from asserting a statute of limitations 
defense unless they maintained a presence in Ohio, but 
served no weighty state interest due to the fact that 
Ohio's long-arm statute permitted service on foreign 
corporations at any time. Bendix was applied to section 
351 by the Ninth Circuit in Abramson v. Brownstein (9th 
Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 389, which involved a 
Massachusetts resident who had entered into an 
agreement with two California residents. The California 
residents sued for breach of contract and fraud long after 
the fact, and relied on section 351 to establish that 
otherwise applicable statutes of limitations had been 
tolled. The Ninth Circuit held that applying section 351 
to the situation would impermissibly burden interstate 
commerce, reasoning that "[section 351] forces a 
nonresident individual engaged in interstate commerce to 
choose between being present in California for several 
[*13] years or forfeiture of the limitations defense, 
remaining subject to suit in California in perpetuity." (Id. 
at p. 392.) 
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In Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng (1999) 71 Cal. App A th 
1276, this court considered whether section 351 was 
constitutionally sound when its provisions were applied 
to a California resident engaged in interstate commerce. 
In Filet Menu, California resident Warren Cheng was 
sued for breach of contract and other related claims. The 
complaint alleged that Cheng was absent from California 
for periods sufficient to toll the running of the applicable 
statutory period, but did not allege the specific reasons 
for Cheng's out-of-state travel. We concluded that 
''section 351 imposes a special burden on residents who 
travel in the course of interstate commerce that is not 
shared by residents involved solely in 'local business and 
trade . . . .'" (Id. at p. 1282, quoting Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 
891.) "Residents engaged in interstate commerce often 
travel outside the state to facilitate this activity, unlike 
residents who are otherwise occupied or employed. Thus, 
section [*14] 351 poses a hard choice to residents who 
engage in interstate commerce and who face potential 
liability arising out of this economic activity that section 
351 does not pose to other residents. Residents occupied 
in interstate commerce must curtail their travel outside 
the state in the course of interstate commerce to avoid the 
tolling provisions of section 351, or endure extended 
exposure to litigation because of their travel in the course 
of interstate commerce." (Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng, 
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283.) At the same time, we 
found no state interest to outweigh this burden since 
"residents are equally subject to service, regardless of 
their reasons for traveling out of state." (Ibid.) 
We found support for our conclusion in the case of 
Tesar v. Hallas (N.D. Ohio 1990) 738 F. Supp. 240, in 
which the court had held that "interstate commerce is 
affected when persons move between states in the course 
of or in search for employment" in applying Bendix to a 
case involving a defendant who had moved from Ohio to 
Pennsylvania to take a new job. Relying on numerous 
cases that held that interstate commerce is impacted 
when persons [*15] move between states to search for 
employment (id. at p. 242, and cases cited therein), the 
court concluded that there was no justification in forcing 
people to chose between an out-of-state job and enjoying 
the protections of the various statutes of limitations when 
Ohio's long-arm statute provided jurisdiction over all 
those alleged to have engaged in wrongful activity in the 
state (ibid.). 
We see no reason to depart from the views expressed 
in Filet Menu. Dr. Medeiros, a former California 
resident, moved to Texas to take a new job in 1998, 
thereby engaging in interstate commerce. He has been 
frilly amenable to service under California's long-arm 
statute since that time. There is no sound basis for 
imposing a burden on him that would not have been 
imposed had he remained a California resident, or 
forcing him to choose between a new job in a different 
state and unlimited exposure to litigation arising from his 
work in California. Under Bendix, section 351 cannot be 
used to toll the otherwise applicable statute of 
limitations. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
CURRY, J. 
We concur: 
EPSTEIN, J., Acting P.J. 
HASTINGS, J. 
